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INTRODUCTION

When Jacqui Rogers bought high-end Weiss butterfly brooches on eBay, her
excitement about the bargain price may have overpowered any skepticism about
their authenticity.1 She knew they were fakes as soon as she opened the box.2
Jacqui confronted the seller and got her money back,3 but many people in
Jacqui’s position are not so fortunate. Who is responsible for this variety of
trademark infringement: the vendor who–knowingly or unknowingly–directly
infringed Weiss’ trademark, Weiss for failing to police its trademark, or eBay for
failing to prevent trademark infringement from proliferating on its platform?
What if Weiss had notified eBay that those specific brooches were counterfeits?
Or if Weiss had told eBay that the vendor was selling fakes? What if Weiss had
given eBay a more general notice that there were counterfeit brooches sold on
its platform? Was eBay required to investigate and stop counterfeiting of
trademarks on its platform? What exactly was eBay required to do to avoid
liability, and when was that duty triggered?
The answers to these questions need to be clear, but they are far from that.
The answers depend on the circuit in which the lawsuit is heard. A clear answer
is critical to allow both trademark registrants and online marketplace operators
to plan, weigh risks, and allocate resources to protect intellectual property rights
and consumers cost-efficiently.
The Lanham Act is silent on the issue. The Supreme Court has never decided
a contributory trademark infringement case outside the context of
manufacturing, much less one in the context of an online marketplace. The
circuit courts have developed divergent standards for liability both between
circuits and even, apparently, within the Second Circuit, particularly as to the
specificity of information required for liability under a theory of willful
blindness.4
The Second Circuit decided a case in the last year that increased uncertainty
for both trademark registrants and online marketplace operators.5 For the last
decade, many practitioners and scholars believed that Tiffany v. eBay6 stood for
Katie Hafner, Seeing Fakes, Angry Traders Confront eBay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/technology/seeing-fakes-angry-traders-confrontebay.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Compare Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a
marketplace owner did not have a duty to take precautions against infringement about which
it had only a generalized knowledge), with Luxottica Group, S.p.A. v. Airport Mini Mall, LLC,
932 F.3d 1303, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2019) (declining to decide whether knowledge of specific
acts of direct infringement is required under a willful blindness analysis), and Omega SA v. 375
Canal, LLC, 984 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that a marketplace owner had a duty to
take precautions against infringers about which it had no specific knowledge).
5 Omega, 984 F.3d at 255.
6 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
1
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the following proposition: an online marketplace cannot be contributorily liable
for trademark infringement unless it (1) failed to remove from its platform
infringing goods or vendors that repeatedly sold infringing goods (2) of which
the marketplace had specific knowledge.7 But not all circuits have adopted the
Tiffany standard.8 The Second Circuit—the same court that decided Tiffany—
seemingly expanded Tiffany in 2021. In Omega v. 375 Canal, the Second Circuit
held a building owner liable for infringement on their property despite their lack
of any specific knowledge of the infringement.9
The tension created by the Second Circuit’s application of the willful
blindness doctrine, together with already-divergent standards amongst the circuit
courts of appeal, causes confusion for all parties that play a role in trademark
enforcement.10 This confusion increases costs, which the parties pass on to
consumers.11 The lack of a clear and uniform liability standard, from either the
legislature or judiciary, clouds the decision-making of both trademark registrants
and online marketplace operators.12 The lack of clarity makes it difficult for
companies to make decisions as to their obligations to each other, their
obligations to consumers, and the resources they are each obligated or willing to
devote to policing trademark infringement.13
This Note argues that the willful blindness doctrine—as applied by the
Second Circuit in Omega in particular—should be restricted or eliminated as an
end-run around traditional contributory trademark infringement liability. The
willful blindness doctrine undermines the traditional rule against an affirmative
duty to root out infringement, creates uncertainty where business enterprises
need clarity, and makes even less sense in the online context than it might
elsewhere. Trademark registrants—not online marketplace operators—should
bear the burden of policing online marketplaces for trademark infringement.
Compare ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF TRADEMARK LAW 202
(1st ed. 2021) (“The pivotal issue in [Tiffany v. eBay] was whether ‘probabilistic’ knowledge that
a significant percentage of the activity on eBay was infringing sufficed, or whether a plaintiff
like Tiffany had to show specific knowledge on a case-by-case basis for each infringing act.
The Second Circuit endorsed the latter view.”), with Eric Goldman, eBay Mostly Beats Tiffany in
the Second Circuit, but False Advertising Claims Remanded, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Apr. 1, 2010),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/04/ebay_mostly_bea.htm (“eBay’s generalized
knowledge of counterfeiting activities on the site was insufficient [for contributory
infringement liability] . . . Unfortunately, the court did not stop there. Instead, the court . . .
articulated a new and troublesome legal standard [for willful blindness].”).
8 Compare Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107, with Omega, 984 F.3d at 255.
9 Omega, 984 F.3d at 254 (“[A] defendant may be held liable for contributory trademark
infringement despite not knowing the identity of a specific vendor who was selling counterfeit
goods, as long as the lack of knowledge was due to willful blindness.”).
10 See, e.g., infra note 133 and accompanying text (demonstrating reasonable confusion as to the
knowledge standard for liability under a willful blindness theory).
11 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 7, at 203.
12 See, e.g., infra note 133 and accompanying text (demonstrating marketplace owner’s
confusion as to when a duty to investigate is triggered).
13 Id.
7
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This Note explores the background of contributory trademark infringement
in Section II to lay the groundwork for understanding the problem presented in
online marketplaces. Section III analyzes modern contributory trademark
infringement jurisprudence and the willful blindness doctrine, followed by an
analysis of potential solutions to the problem. Ultimately, this Note argues that
trademark registrants should bear the burden of policing their trademarks and
that the willful blindness doctrine should be eliminated or significantly limited in
this context.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE LANHAM ACT PROVIDES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT

A trademark is “a device used by a merchant to identify its goods or services
and distinguish them from those of others.”14 Trademarks are the bricks with
which a brand name is built. Though the exact origin of trademarks is lost to the
fog of history, merchants have placed distinctive marks on their goods since
ancient times.15 Trade expanded as the world emerged from the Dark Ages, and
merchants began to mark their goods so that customers in distant markets could
identify the source of otherwise-generic products.16 Identifying the source of a
product was critical to enabling repeat purchases of goods customers liked.17
One age-old debate in American trademark law is whether trademarks are
meant to protect producers or consumers.18 Some scholars argue that the main
goal of trademark law is best understood as protecting producers’ “property right
in the mark and only secondarily on protecting consumers from confusion.”19
Other scholars tend to view trademark law as a form of consumer protection at
its core.20
The United States Congress first codified a federal trademark protection
system in the act of July 8, 1870.21 The statute allowed for trademark registration
with the Patent Office and created a civil cause of action for trademark
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 7, at 1.
Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222, 222
(1983).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.1
(5th ed. 2022).
19 Id. (citing Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2007)).
20 Id. (citing Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 560 n.59 (2006)); STEPHAN KINSELLA, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 58 (2001) (“In my view, it is the consumers whose rights are violated [by trademark
infringement].”).
21 Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198, §§ 77-84; Id. at § 5.3.
14
15
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infringement.22 Less than a decade later, in 1876, Congress created a criminal
statute that penalized trademark infringement and counterfeiting with a fine and
imprisonment.23
The Supreme Court overturned both statutes as unconstitutional.24 The
Court consolidated three cases, now collectively known as “The Trademark
Cases” to resolve a circuit split and review the constitutionality of Congress’
trademark protection scheme.25 The Court held that the regulation of trademarks
fell outside of Congress’ Copyright and Patent Clause26 powers.27 Thus, the
Court reasoned that they must have been an exercise of Commerce Clause
powers and held them unconstitutional as such.28
Congress responded to The Trademark Cases by passing a new trademark
statute under its Commerce Clause powers in the Act of March 3, 1881.29 The
1881 Act proved inadequate since it provided no trademark protection for
domestic interstate commerce.30 In 1905, Congress passed the first “modern”
federal trademark statute.31 The 1905 Act did not allow the registration of
descriptive marks—geographical terms, personal names of individuals, names of
firms, or names of corporations—and proved insufficient to deal with the
realities of 20th century global trade even after several amendments.32
The American Bar Association approved a draft bill in 1920 to replace the
1905 Act.33 Nearly two decades later, in 1937, Edward Rogers, the author of the
draft bill, gave his personal draft to Congressman Fritz Lanham.34 Congressman
Lanham introduced the draft as a house resolution the next year.35 World War II
shifted Congress’ focus to more pressing problems, but Congress eventually
passed the Lanham Act in 1946, which continues to govern American trademark
law today.36

In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92.
Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 91-92.
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[The Congress shall have power] [t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
27 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
28 Id. at 91 (using a traditional narrow understanding of the scope of the commerce clause).
29 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 5:3; Act of March 3, 1881, 21 Stat. 502.
30 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 5:3.
31 Id. (citing Act of Feb. 20, 1905, 33 Stat. 724, 15 U.S.C. §§ 81 et seq.).
32 Id.
33 Id. at § 5:4.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
22
23
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The Lanham Act includes a civil cause of action for trademark infringement.37
The fundamental test of infringement—under both common law and statutory
law—is “likelihood of confusion.”38 Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff alleging
trademark infringement “has the burden to plead and prove both validity and
infringement.”39 A plaintiff proves trademark infringement by showing that a
defendant’s use of a mark is likely to cause consumers to be confused, mistaken
or deceived about the source of the goods bearing that mark.40 The Lanham
Act’s civil cause of action provides a remedy for owners of valid trademarks
when they are infringed.
B. CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IMPORTED FROM TORT
COMMON LAW

1. Contributory Trademark Infringement Generally
No provision of the Lanham Act created a cause of action of secondary
infringement.41 In the mid-20th Century, though, courts often implied causes of
action that are not explicit if the cause of action was consistent with the statute’s
purpose.42 During that time period, courts imported both vicarious and
contributory liability doctrines into trademark law from the common law of
torts.43
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 23:1 (“Infringement of federally registered marks is governed
by the same test: whether the defendant’s use is ‘likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive’ . . . Through decades of case law precedent and the influence of the Restatement,
the federal courts have developed a multi-factor test to assist in the difficult determination of
whether there is or is not a likelihood (probability) of confusion.”).
39 Id.; see also M. Elaine Buccieri, Cause of Action for Trademark Infringement Under the Lanham Act,
in 10 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 501 § 2 (2022) (“To establish a prima facie case for [direct]
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, the ‘plaintiff must prove that: (1) the mark is
distinctive and has been used in commerce, (2) the plaintiff is the . . . owner of the mark[, and]
(3) the defendant is using a similar mark which is likely to cause confusion.’”).
40 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, WHAT IS A TRADEMARK? 13 (3d ed. 2009) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A); Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A)).
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (creating a cause of action only for direct infringement).
42 Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017).
43 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Contributory trademark
infringement is a judicially created doctrine that derives from the common law of torts.”);
Omega SA v. 375 Canal, LLC, 984 F.3d 244, 254 n.11 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Inwood Lab’ys,
Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982)) (“The Lanham Act does not expressly create
liability for contributory trademark infringement, but the Supreme Court has concluded that
‘liability for trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods
with the mark of another.’”); Bryan Huntington, Lessor Beware: Courts are Increasingly Willing to
Hold Commercial Landlords Liable for Their Tenants’ Trademark Infringement, 76 BENCH & B. MINN.
27, 27 (2019); see Buccieri, supra note 39, § 25 (“Trademark infringement is generally considered
a tort and any member of the distribution chain may be liable as a joint tortfeasor.”); Inwood
Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982) (“[L]iability for trademark
infringement can extend beyond those who [directly infringe the trademark] . . . Even if a
37
38
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The Supreme Court articulated the test for contributory trademark
infringement in 1982 in its Inwood v. Ives44 decision and has not expanded the test
in the subsequent decades.45 In Inwood, the plaintiff—Ives Laboratories (Ives)—
was the manufacturer of the drug cyclandelate, which it marketed under the
registered trademark Cyclospasmol.46 Ives used an arbitrary color scheme that
corresponded to the pills’ dosage.47 Once Ives’ patent expired, the defendant—
Inwood Laboratories (Inwood)—started producing generic cyclandelate and
intentionally used the same color scheme that Ives used.48 Some catalogs Inwood
sent to pharmacists highlighted that the generic cyclandelate was identical in
color and less expensive than Ives’ Cyclospasmol.49 Ives brought suit, alleging
that some pharmacists had sold generic cyclandelate mislabeled as
Cyclospasmol.50 Ives further argued that Inwood, among other defendants, was
contributorily liable for the infringement because they induced the pharmacists
to infringe Ives’s mark.51 Ives argued that Inwood induced the infringement by
copying the Cyclospasmol color scheme and advertising the price difference
between the generic and brand-name versions.52
The District Court disagreed, finding that the mislabeling was based on a
misunderstanding of New York Drug Substitution Law.53 The Second Circuit
reversed the District Court’s holding, and the defendant appealed.54 The
Supreme Court agreed with Ives and reversed both the District Court and the
Second Circuit.55 In the process, the Court established the modern contributory
trademark infringement test:

manufacturer does not directly control others in the chain of distribution, it can be held
responsible for their infringing activities under certain circumstances.”).
44 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 844.
45 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 25.18; ANNE GILSON LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, 3 GILSON
ON TRADEMARKS § 11.02(4)(g)(ii)(A) (2021); Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107 (noting that the Supreme
Court has not dealt with contributory trademark infringement since Inwood).
46 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 846.
47 Id. at 847.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 848.
50 Id. at 849.
51 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 850.
52 Id. at 850.
53 Ives Lab’ys, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 394, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[The
druggists who were test shopped by Ives] appear not deliberately to have been attempting to
pass of the generic product as Cyclospasmol but rather to have misunderstood the precise
requirements of the New York Drug Substitution Law.”).
54 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 850 (White, J. concurring) (“[T]he Second Circuit found defendants liable
for contributory infringement by revising and expanding the doctrine of contributory
trademark infringement.”).
55 Id. (majority opinion).
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[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another
to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to
one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in
trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is
contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of the
deceit.56
The world of commerce has radically changed since the 1980s,57 but the
Supreme Court has never extended the Inwood test beyond the context of
manufacture and distribution.58 The Inwood test allows trademark registrants to
hold manufacturers and distributors liable for contributory trademark
infringement in two scenarios.59 In the first scenario a manufacturer or
distributor induces the infringement. The second scenario is more complex and
applies more readily to commercial entities like online marketplaces. Broken
down into its elements, the test for liability in the second scenario requires that:
1. A manufacturer or distributor
2. continues to supply its product
3. to someone it
a. knows is engaging in trademark infringement or
b. has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.60
In the nearly 40 years since Inwood, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress
have addressed (1) what services outside of manufacture and distribution of
physical goods can give rise to liability under Inwood or (2) how a court should
determine that a defendant had “reason to know” of infringement.61 Instead, the
lower courts have extended the Inwood test to deal with the realities of the twentyfirst century.62
2. Contributory Trademark Infringement Liability for Service Providers

Id. at 854 (first citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 S. Ct. 615, 530–31
(1924); then citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp 980 (Mass. 1946),
aff’d, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1974)).
57 See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 951 (C.D. Cal.
1997), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting the importance of the internet to commerce).
58 Supra note 45.
59 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854.
60 Id.
61 Supra note 45.
62 See infra note 67 (noting that most courts have extended the test to marketplace operators).
56
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The Supreme Court designed the Inwood test for manufacturers and
distributors of products.63 The Seventh Circuit first extended the Inwood test to
physical marketplace operators but applied tort law principles of landlord liability
to avoid defining when service providers can be contributorily liable.64 The Ninth
Circuit took on the task and established the test for service provider contributory
liability that is widely used today.65
Courts in most circuits have extended the Inwood test to marketplace
operators—especially marketplace landlords and licensors—even though most
contributory trademark infringement cases continue to crop up in the context of
manufacturing.66 The trend started in the 1990s67 and accelerated rapidly around
2011 with a barrage of lawsuits brought by Coach, Inc.68 Interestingly—but
perhaps not surprisingly—many of these suits were brought against owners and
operators of flea markets and swap meets.69
One major case in this context is Hard Rock v. CSI.70 The Seventh Circuit held
that a flea market operator could be contributorily liable for the infringement of
its vendors if it (1) knew or had reason to know of the infringement and did
nothing or (2) was willfully blind, which it defined as “suspect[ed] wrongdoing
and deliberately fail[ed] to investigate.”71 Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corporation
(Hard Rock) sent investigators to several flea markets owned by Concession
Services Incorporated (CSI).72 After finding infringement by vendors, Hard Rock
Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854 (noting that manufacturers and distributors can be liable for
contributory trademark infringement).
64 Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (7th
Cir. 1992) (“The common law, then, imposes the same duty on landlords and licensors that
the Supreme Court has imposed on manufacturers and distributors.”).
65 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“Direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the
plaintiff’s mark permits the expansion of [Inwood’s] ‘supplies a product’ requirement for
contributory infringement.”).
66 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., 1 PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS § 5.60 (2d ed. 2021).
67 See, e.g., Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149 (flea market owner and operator); Polo Ralph Lauren
Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, 855 F. Supp. 648, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Hard Rock, 955
F.2d at 1149) (landlord); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir.
1996) (citing Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149) (swap meet operator).
68 See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Farmers Mkt. & Auction, 881 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700-01 (D. Md. 2012)
(first citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264–65; then citing Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148–50) (flea
market owner); Coach, Inc. v. Swap Shop, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278–80 (S.D. Fla.
2012) (first citing Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1150; then citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265; and then
citing Farmers Mkt., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 706) (flea market operator); Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow,
717 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) (first citing Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149; then citing Fonovisa,
76 F.3d at 261) (flea market operator); Coach, Inc. v. Sapatis, 994 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198–99
(D.N.H. 2014) (flea market operator).
69 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (listing suits brought against owners and
operators of flea markets and swap meets).
70 Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1143.
71 Id. at 1149.
72 Id. at 1145.
63
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sued CSI for contributory infringement.73 The Seventh Circuit applied the Inwood
test, noting that it was unclear how the test should apply to service providers.74
The court then turned to tort law for guidance, which “imposes the same duty
on landlords and licensors that the Supreme Court has imposed on
manufacturers and distributors [in Inwood].”75 That is, CSI in its capacity as a
landlord or licensor was “responsible for the torts of those it permits on its
premises ‘knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting or will act
tortiously.’”76
Here, the district court had not found that CSI knew about the infringement.77
Instead, the district court had held CSI liable under a willful blindness theory, a
theory this Note will discuss in greater depth in the next Section.78 The Seventh
Circuit took issue with the district court’s willful blindness analysis, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case.79
Hard Rock moved the ball forward into the realm of landlords and licensors
who provide a service, but it still did not define when a service places the provider
within the Inwood framework. In the late 1990s, Lockheed Martin—a defense
contractor and lobbying organization80—filed a trademark infringement claim
against Network Solutions, Incorporated (NSI)—a domain name registrar.81 A
Domain Name Services (DNS) allows website owners to register their IP address
with a “domain name registrar,” which then associates that IP address with a
domain name.82 After a user types a domain name into their browser, the browser
communicates with a DNS to find out what IP address is associated with that
domain name and routes the user accordingly.83
The root of Lockheed Martin’s claim was that NSI had infringed its “Skunk
Works”84 trademark by allowing a third party to register it as a domain name.85
Several third parties had registered domain names confusingly similar to “Skunk

Id. at 1147.
Id.
75 Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149.
76 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1979)).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1150.
80 Bryan Bender & Sarah Cammarata, Defense Lobby Spending Totals for 2020, POLITICO (Jan. 29,
2021,
10:00
AM),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morningdefense/2021/01/29/defense-lobby-spending-totals-for-2020-793059.
81 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1997),
aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
82 Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 952 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
83 Id.
84 SKUNK WORKS, Registration No. 2532721.
85 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1999).
73
74
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Works.”86 Lockheed Martin successfully convinced some of the owners to
abandon their domain names but did not register those domain names for itself.87
The Ninth Circuit, citing Hard Rock and Fonovisa,88 formulated and applied the
following rule in Lockheed to decide whether the “supplies a product” prong of
the Inwood test had been met: “[d]irect control and monitoring of the
instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark permits the
expansion of [Inwood’s] ‘supplies a product’ requirement for contributory
infringement.”89 The court ultimately distinguished the case from Hard Rock and
Fonovisa and held that NSI had not infringed Lockheed Martin’s trademark.90 The
“rote translation” done by a DNS was not sufficient to meet the “supplies a
product” prong of the Inwood test.91
Hard Rock and Lockheed laid the groundwork for courts to extend the Inwood
Test to online service providers. The Second Circuit extended the Inwood test to
online marketplaces in Tiffany v. eBay.92 The application of Inwood to eBay was
contested at the trial court level, although the issue was not on appeal.93 Over
the objections of the defendant-appellant, which argued that Inwood “governs
only manufacturers and distributors of products,” the district court adopted the
Ninth Circuit’s approach in Lockheed.94 The court “concluded that Inwood
applied in light of the ‘significant control’ eBay retained over the transactions
and listings facilitated by and conducted through its website.”95
C. THE WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE IMPORTED FROM CRIMINAL LAW TO
CIVIL LAW

This brings us to the “knows or has reason to know” prong of the Inwood
test.96 The willful blindness doctrine is not native to trademark law or even to

The domain names at issue included, among others, skunkworks.com, skunkworx.com, and
skunkwurks.com. Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 984 (“Hard Rock and Fonovisa teach us that when measuring and weighing a fact patter
in the contributory infringement context without the convenient ‘product’ mold dealt with in
Inwood [], we consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third party’s
means of infringement.”) (first citing Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148-49; then citing Fonovisa, 76
F.3d at 265).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 985.
91 Hard Rock, 149 F.3d at 985.
92 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2010).
93 Id. (“In the district court, the parties disputed whether eBay was subject to the Inwood test .
. . On appeal, eBay no longer maintains that it is not subject to Inwood.”).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Inwood Lab'ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab'ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
86
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the civil law more generally. The doctrine originated in criminal law and has been
grafted onto the civil law.97
Section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code, for example, states that “[w]hen
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence,
unless he actually believes that it does not exist.”98 The Model Penal Code,
however, does not elaborate on what qualifies as a “high probability.” Even if it
did, it is not obvious that a criminal law knowledge requirement should apply at
all in a civil matter like trademark infringement.
The debate over the level of specificity of information required under a willful
blindness analysis has raged for well over a century.99 English courts agreed that
“actual knowledge was unnecessary for conviction [of a crime] if the defendant
purposely abstained from acquiring” knowledge of their culpability.100 But some
English courts required a “failure to investigate a suspicion of wrongdoing,” and
others required “that criminal activity was obvious to the defendant . . . because
such evidence suggested that the defendant’s ignorance was really just a
charade.”101
All of the federal courts have adopted some version of the willful blindness
doctrine.102 The Supreme Court applied the doctrine to patent infringement in
Global-Tech v. SEB,103 but it has never applied the doctrine in a trademark
infringement case.
The Seventh Circuit left consequential questions unaddressed in Hard Rock: in
a willful blindness analysis, what does it mean to suspect wrongdoing? Do
marketplace operators need specific information about specific infringement,
general information that infringement is occurring, or only knowledge that some
probability exists that infringement is occurring? This is the juncture at which
courts across the nation part ways.104
In some circuits, the answer is still unsettled. For example, in its 2019 decision
in Luxottica v. Airport Mini Mall, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly declined to decide
the specificity of knowledge a defendant must have to be willfully blind.105 In
See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766-68 (2011) (importing
the doctrine of willful blindness from criminal law into patent law).
98 Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) (AM. LAW. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
99 Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 YALE L.J. 2231,
2234 (1993).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 2232.
103 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 768 (2011).
104 Supra note 4 and accompanying text.
105 Luxottica Group, S.p.A. v. Airport Mini Mall, LLC, 932 F.3d 1303, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“The question that arises—another one of first impression for this Court—is whether the
knowledge theory of contributory liability requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
had actual or constructive knowledge of specific infringing acts . . . we need not decide today
97
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that case, Luxottica Group alleged that Airport Mini Mall (AMM)—a landlord
that leased booths to vendors106—was contributorily liable for its vendors’ direct
infringement of trademarks owned by Luxottica and its subsidiaries.107 The
police raided AMM three times and seized—on one occasion—thousands of
goods that allegedly infringed Luxottica’s trademarks.108
The defendant also received letters from Luxottica notifying the defendant
that its vendors were not authorized Oakley or Ray-Ban dealers and identifying
specific booths suspected of infringement.109 The court held that “the evidence
in this case was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendants had at
least constructive knowledge of (or were willfully blind to) specific acts of direct
infringement.”110 The court did not have to decide whether something less than
actual knowledge of specific acts of direct infringement would suffice here, so
the court did not decide on a specific standard.111
District courts in the Ninth Circuit have rejected the notion that generalized
knowledge is enough to establish willful blindness.112 In Spy Phone Labs v. Google,
the court denied the motion to dismiss, but only because the plaintiff had alleged
that the defendant had specific knowledge of a specific developer who previously
infringed on the same specific mark.113 The court noted that if plaintiff had given
generalized notice without identifying specific infringing developers or
applications, the defendant would not have had a duty to investigate.114
The Second Circuit’s analysis of this issue is particularly interesting because it
has not settled on an easily discernable rule, despite the notoriety of its opinion
in Tiffany.115 “[A] significant portion of the ‘Tiffany’ sterling silver listed on the
eBay website . . . was counterfeit,”116 and “eBay knew ‘that some portion of the

whether a defendant must be found to have actual knowledge of specific acts of direct
infringement for contributory liability to attach.”).
106 Id. at 1309.
107 Id. at 1310. Luxottica and its subsidiary owned the Oakley and Ray-Ban trademarks. Id. at
1309.
108 Id. at 1309.
109 Id. at 1309-10.
110 Luxottica, 932 F.3d at 1313-14.
111 Id. at 1314.
112 See, e.g., Spy Phone Labs LLC. V. Google Inc., No. 15-cv-03756-KAW, 2016 WL 6025469,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016) (noting that generalized knowledge is insufficient to establish
willful blindness).
113 Id.
114 Id. at *6.
115 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); see generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra
note 18, § 25:20.50 (noting that Tiffany was the first decision to address internet marketplace
liability for contributory trademark infringement).
116 Id. at 98 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
For context, “Tiffany (NJ) Inc. and Tiffany and Company (together, ‘Tiffany’)” is a jewelry
manufacturer “bespeaking high-end quality and style.” Id. at 96.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss2/3

14

Ligon Fant: Reconsidering the Willful Blindness Doctrine in Contributory Trad

332

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 29:2

Tiffany goods sold on its website might be counterfeit.’”117 eBay went to great
lengths to detect and prevent the sale of counterfeits on its website. eBay hired
over 200 employees to fight trademark infringement, used cutting edge
technology to detect infringement, and maintained a system for trademark
registrants to identify infringing listings for removal.118 eBay removed most of
the infringing listings identified by trademark registrants within twelve hours.119
Unsurprisingly, eBay was unable to find and eliminate all trademark
infringement from its website.120 Tiffany brought suit alleging, among other
things, contributory trademark infringement.121 The Second Circuit held that
“[f]or contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service provider must
have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being
used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which
particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.”122 The
Second Circuit did not elaborate much in its willful blindness analysis, but it
stated that the district court did not err in its finding that eBay was not willfully
blind.123
The Southern District of New York, whose decision the Second Circuit ruled
was not in error, provides more on willful blindness.124 The court adopted the
view that specific knowledge of individual counterfeiters is required to establish
willful blindness.125 The court noted that “the law does not impose a duty on
eBay to take steps in response to a generalized knowledge of infringement.”126
In 2021, the Second Circuit handed down its ruling in Omega v. Canal,127 which
apparently contradicts but did not overrule or even distinguish Tiffany.128 Omega,
Id. (citing Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 507). For context, eBay, Inc. operates an “eponymous
online marketplace . . . [that] has facilitated the buying and selling by hundreds of millions of
people and entities . . . [that] is sometimes employed by users as a means to perpetrate fraud
by selling counterfeit goods.” Id. at 96.
118 Id. at 98-99.
119 Id. at 99.
120 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that Tiffany found
many infringing products on eBay’s marketplace both prior to and during the litigation).
121 Id. at 103.
122 Id. at 107.
123 Id. at 110.
124 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 513-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
125 Id. at 515 (“Were Tiffany to prevail in its argument that eBay was willfully blind, the ‘reason
to know’ standard of the Inwood test would be inflated into an affirmative duty to take
precautions against potential counterfeiters, even when eBay had no specific knowledge of the
individual counterfeiters.”).
126 Id. at 514.
127 Omega SA v. 375 Canal, LLC, 984 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2021).
128 Compare Omega, 984 F.3d at 255 (“Tiffany provided a test for identifying which scenarios
could result in liability: ‘[C]ontributory liability may arise where a defendant is . . . made aware
that there was infringement on its site but . . . ignored that fact.”), with Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107
(“For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service provider must have more
117
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a luxury watch manufacturer, sued Canal, the owner of a Manhattan property
that had a “long history of litigation alleging counterfeiting and trademark
violations,” for contributory trademark infringement.129 Omega sent Canal a
letter informing Canal that vendors on its property were infringing Omega’s
trademarks, but Omega did not identify specific vendors to Canal.130 A private
investigator hired by Omega later purchased a counterfeit watch at the Canal
property before Omega finally filed suit.131 The jury found that Canal was
willfully blind to infringement and awarded Omega $1.1 million in statutory
damages.132 Canal appealed, relying on Tiffany to argue that it could not be
willfully blind when it had only generalized knowledge of infringement:
Omega’s core theory is, of course, entirely incompatible with
[Tiffany] . . . In Tiffany, eBay’s website was, in Omega’s words,
“used to sell counterfeit goods” . . . This Court nevertheless held
that eBay could not be liable for contributory trademark
infringement because the plaintiff had not established that eBay
continued to provide services to specific infringers, after eBay
knew or had reason to know that those specific infringers were
engaged in trademark infringement. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 106-109.
Put another way, Tiffany explicitly and unambiguously rejected
Omega’s core legal theory in this case, which should be the end
of the matter.133
That was not the end of the matter. The Second Circuit held that generalized
knowledge of infringement imposes on a marketplace owner a duty to
“undertake[] bona fide efforts to root [it] out.”134 “If [a defendant] undertakes
bona fide efforts to root out infringement, such as eBay did in Tiffany, that will
support a verdict of no liability . . . But if the defendant decides to take no or
little action, it will support a verdict finding liability.”135
In the wake of Omega v. Canal, a marketplace owner is back to wondering when
exactly they are required to investigate and remediate infringement to avoid
than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit
goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will
infringe in the future is necessary.”).
129 Omega, 984 F.3d at 248.
130 Id. at 249.
131 Id. at 249.
132 Id. at 250.
133 Reply Br. for Defendant-Appellant *1, Omega, SA v. 375 Canal, LLC, 984 F. 3d 244 (2d
Cir.) (No. 19-969-CV), 2020 WL 282330.
134 Omega, 984 F.3d at 255.
135 Id.
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liability. Nothing in the Omega decision suggested that the Second Circuit
viewed Canal differently from eBay since one was a physical marketplace and the
other online. Instead, the Second Circuit insisted that Tiffany did not eliminate
liability for marketplace owners who lack specific knowledge of infringement.136
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE MODERN TREND IS TO SHIFT THE DUTY TO POLICE TRADEMARKS TO
MARKETPLACES

The modern trend in contributory trademark infringement thought appears
to be moving in the direction of imposing more responsibility and liability on
marketplaces both by judicial and legislative action.137 Neither the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition’s approach nor legislative proposals would
address the problem of commercial uncertainty.
1. The Restatement’s Approach is Incompatible with the Cases
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition takes the aggressive position
that a marketplace should be liable for contributory trademark infringement if it
"fails to take reasonable precautions . . . in circumstances in which the infringing
conduct can be reasonably anticipated." 138 A comment to the Restatement
section attempts to clarify: “The duty to take reasonable precautions, however,
arises only when the manufacturer or distributor has reason to anticipate that
some substantial number of infringing sales will otherwise occur.”139
The Restatement’s approach does not help a marketplace owner—or
trademark registrant for that matter—understand when that duty is activated. The
Restatement’s approach would impose on marketplace owners an affirmative
duty to seek out infringement. After all, could every marketplace owner not
reasonably anticipate that at some point one of their vendors will infringe a
trademark?
Imposing an affirmative duty of that type has been repeatedly rejected by
courts.140 The duty would place the burden of policing trademarks on
marketplaces. Both physical and online marketplace owners are ill-equipped to
police trademarks, and online marketplaces are not even in a better position than
the trademark registrant to do so. The Restatement’s view would essentially allow
Id. at 255 (asserting that under Tiffany generalized knowledge of infringement gives rise to
a duty to conduct a bona fide investigation).
137 See, e.g., id. (imposing a duty to investigate on a defendant who had only generalized
knowledge of infringement); SHOP SAFE Act of 2021, S. 1843, 117th Cong. (2021).
138 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (AM. L. INST. 1995).
139 Id. at § 27 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1995).
140 See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[G]eneralized
knowledge of infringement . . . was not sufficient to impose . . . an affirmative duty to remedy
the problem.”).
136
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trademark registrants to shift their burden of policing to the entities ostensibly
selling their goods.
The Restatement’s comments go even further in its view that distributors have
an affirmative duty to take precautions against trademark infringement: “This
section recognizes [contributory trademark infringement] liability when the
manufacturer or distributor accepts the benefits of the infringement by failing to
take reasonable precautions against its occurrence."141 This standard would
indeed impose an affirmative duty on every marketplace that benefits from sales
to take precautions against infringement.
2. Legislative Proposals Fall Short of Solving the Problem
Recently, there has been a move towards statutory solutions to
counterfeiting and contributory trademark infringement.142 The legislative
proposals have offered some promise of addressing the commercial problems—
uncertainty both as to which party bears the burden of policing infringement and
the requirements for avoiding liability—but fall short more generally.
The Stopping Harmful Offers on Platforms by Screening Against Fakes in ECommerce (SHOP SAFE) Act of 2021 is a good example of such proposed
legislation.143 The bill purports to amend the Lanham Act to statutorily impose
contributory trademark infringement liability on electronic commerce platforms
unless the platform meets certain safe harbor requirements.144
The SHOP SAFE Act has its virtues. For example, it codifies the “continues
to supply” prong of Inwood and its progeny.145 It eliminates uncertainty as to when
a marketplace is obligated to ban a vendor who is a repeat-offender with a “three
strikes in a year and you’re out” rule.146 The SHOP SAFE Act is also endorsed
by the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Intellectual Property Law.147
The problems with the SHOP SAFE Act, though, are as numerous as its
virtues. The Act only applies to counterfeiting and not to trademark
infringement, more generally, so even if the SHOP SAFE Act were passed into

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1995).
See, e.g., SHOP SAFE Act of 2021, S. 1843, 117th Cong. (2021) (providing a statutory
solution to the lack of uniformity in contributory trademark infringement doctrine).
143 Id.
144 Id. at § 2(a)(4)(A)(x) (“Use of a counterfeit mark by a third-party seller in 3 separate listings
within 1 year shall be considered repeated use, except when reasonable mitigating
circumstances exist.”)
145 Id. at § (a)(4)(A).
146 Id. at § (a)(4)(A)(x).
147 Letter from June M. Besek, Chair of the Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Intell. Prop. Law., to
The Honorable Christopher A. Coons, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Priv.,
Tech., and the L., and The Honorable Thom Tillis, Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary
Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. (July 6, 2021) (on file with the Am. Bar Ass’n),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_property_law/
advocacy/aba-ipl-comment-letter-shop-safe-act-2021-us-senate-7-6-21-1843.pdf.
141
142

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss2/3

18

Ligon Fant: Reconsidering the Willful Blindness Doctrine in Contributory Trad

336

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 29:2

law it would provide no guidance for how marketplaces could avoid liability for
most contributory trademark infringement.148
The SHOP SAFE Act also only applies to products that “implicate health and
safety.”149 The Act defines products that “implicate health and safety,” but the
language is unhelpful in line-drawing and will undoubtedly leave online
marketplaces unsure which products fall under the Act’s umbrella.150 But
regardless of how courts interpret the language, the Act does not apply to all
products. Therefore, products that do not implicate health and safety are back in
the conundrum of modern contributory trademark infringement jurisprudence.
And although the ABA’s letter concerning the SHOP SAFE Act encouraged
Congress to expand the Act to all products if it proves to be successful, it made
no mention of expanding the SHOP SAFE Act to all trademark infringement.151
The most problematic part of the SHOP SAFE Act is its requirement that
online marketplaces implement a program to “expeditiously” take down
counterfeit listings the platform is reasonably aware of.152 The Act adopts a very
broad view—similar to the “reason to know” standard that the Tiffany court
rejected153—of when an online marketplace should be reasonably aware of the
use of a counterfeit mark.154 If an online marketplace has a program but perhaps
does not take down counterfeit listings “expeditiously,” it may be exposed to
liability despite good faith efforts. This could be a reasonable outcome if the
marketplace could otherwise avail itself of a safe haven through reasonable
efforts, but the requirement for such a program is actually an eligibility
requirement for the safe haven.
S. 1843 § 2(a)(4)(A) (“[A]n electronic commerce platform shall be deemed contributorially
liable . . . for a case in which . . . a third-party seller uses in commerce a counterfeit mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods that implicate
health and safety on the platform.”) (emphasis added).
149 Id.
150 Id. at § (a)(4)(B)(iii) (“The term ‘goods that implicate health and safety’ means goods, the
use of which can lead to illness, disease, injury, serious adverse event, allergic reaction, or death
if produced without compliance with all applicable Federal, State, and local health and safety
regulations and industry-designated testing, safety, quality, certification, manufacturing,
packaging, and labeling standards.”).
151 Letter from June M. Besek, supra note 144.
152 S. 1843 § (a)(4)(A)(ix) (“[To avail itself of the safe harbor provision an e-commerce platform
must have] [i]mplemented at no cost to the registrant a program to expeditiously disable or
remove from the platform any listing for which a platform has reasonable awareness of use of
a counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
goods.”).
153 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107 (“For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service
provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being
used to sell counterfeit goods.”).
154 Id. (“Reasonable awareness of use of a counterfeit mark may be inferred based on
information regarding the use of a counterfeit mark on the platform generally, general
information about the third-party seller, identifying characteristics of a particular listing, or
other circumstances as appropriate.”).
148
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The Act purports to create a safe haven, but the numerous exceptions to the
rules and reliance on reasonableness muddy the waters and invite litigation.155
One such exception is found in the Act’s definition of “repeated use of a
counterfeit mark”: “[u]se of a counterfeit mark by a third-party seller in 3 separate
listings within 1 year shall be considered repeated use, except when reasonable
mitigating circumstances exist.”156 What qualifies as a reasonable mitigating
circumstance is anyone’s guess.
Another use of a reasonableness standard that will be problematic for the
SHOP SAFE Act is its requirement, without definition, that online marketplaces
ensure their vendors take reasonable steps to verify authenticity.157
The Act also purports to impact only large online marketplaces with sales of
more than $500,000 annually.158 If a smaller marketplace receives only ten notices
of listings that “reasonably could be determined to have used a counterfeit mark,”
they then fall under the SHOP SAFE Act.159 Therefore, the reality is that the
SHOP SAFE Act will give trademark registrants a tool to legally stifle
competition by shutting down smaller online marketplaces that cannot afford to
avail themselves of the safe harbor provisions.
B. THE WAY FORWARD IS TO STEP BACK

To recap the cause of action for direct trademark infringement is set out in
Section 32 of the Lanham Act.160 The Supreme Court established the current test
for contributory trademark infringement in Inwood.161 In so doing, the Court did
not refer to the text of the Lanham Act but instead cited precedent from before
the Lanham Act was passed into law.162 The Circuit Courts then applied the
doctrine of willful blindness to the knowledge requirement of Inwood’s
contributory trademark infringement test.163 Given these extensions, both of
which exponentially extend the reach of the Lanham Act that Congress actually
passed into law, courts should proceed with great caution.

Id. at § (a)(4)(A).
Id. at § (a)(4)(A)(x).
157 Id. at § (a)(4)(A)(iv).
158 Id. at § (a)(4)(C)(i).
159 S.1843 § (a)(4)(C)(ii) (emphasis added).
160 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
161 Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982).
162 The first case the Court cited to support its statement of the test for contributory trademark
infringement was from 1924. Id. at 854 (citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265
U.S. 526, 530–31 (1924)). The second case the Court cited was decided after the Lanham Act
was passed, but the decision did not reference the Lanham Act and instead also relied on
Warner. Id. (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F.Supp. 980 (Mass. 1946)
(holding that the defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of inducement described in
Warner)).
163 Supra Section II.
155
156
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1. A Narrower Willful Blindness Doctrine is More Consistent with Tort Law
Accepting that contributory trademark infringement is a kind of tort,164
courts should consider how the goals of tort law and purpose of trademark
protection are served by the doctrine. When online marketplaces (1) have specific
information about infringement and (2) they take deliberate steps to avoid
learning more, forcing them to compensate owners of infringed trademarks
aligns with most of the generally accepted goals of tort law.165 The goals of tort
law are not clearly furthered, though, when a defendant has no specific
information about infringement, takes no deliberate action to avoid learning
about the infringement, and a plaintiff does not even need to prove damages.166
A policy argument could be made to support the lower knowledge requirement.
One could argue that online marketplaces, particularly large online marketplaces,
are good risk distributors, that is, “they can ‘distribute’ the costs of paying
compensation” and each of their users will pay only a small fraction of the costs
of policing trademarks on their platform.167 But the judiciary should tread
carefully when considering arguments based primarily on policy.168 This is doubly
true of policy arguments that—like the argument about risk distribution—have
enormous consequences, at least an arguable basis in reality, and at least two valid
ways of being viewed.169 Online marketplaces are also simply not in a good
position to police trademarks, and they are fairly ineffective at doing so even with
great effort and expense.170
Physical marketplace owners have direct physical access to products for
inspection, but that is not the case for online marketplaces.171 Companies like
eBay rarely physically touch or see a product before it is passed from seller to

See, e.g., Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148
(7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e have treated trademark infringement as a species of tort . . . .”).
165 This result is consistent with both the moral responsibility and social policy systems of
thought in tort law. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 15-27 (2d. ed. 2016)
(discussing the systems of thought in tort law).
166 See, e.g., Omega SA v. 375 Canal, LLC, 984 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2021) (awarding $1.1
million in statutory damages for four instances of infringement on one watch). Something
closer to strict liability might be consistent only with the social policy system of thought. See
DOBBS, supra note 165, at 22 (discussing the social policy system of thought in tort law).
167 DOBBS, supra note 165, at 22; see SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 7, at 202-03 (“[I]f the
site owner absorbs the costs, they will be spread over all users of the site.”).
168 DOBBS, supra note 165, at 18-19 (“Judges seldom have data necessary for broad-based policy
judgments . . . about the long term social effects of imposing liability for wrongs.”).
169 ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF TRADEMARK LAW 203 (1st ed.
2021) (recognizing that reasonable minds could differ as to which party should bear the cost
of policing counterfeits.).
170 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the defendant
was unable to identify infringement despite great effort and expense).
171 See, e.g., Id. at 98 (“Because eBay ‘never saw or inspected the merchandise in the listings,’
its ability to determine whether a particular listing was for counterfeit goods was limited.”).
164
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buyer.172 The willful blindness doctrine can make at least some intuitive sense
with a physical marketplace, where an owner could not avoid learning of
infringement unless they were trying not to.173 They can physically walk around
and look at merchandise, but the trademark registrant cannot, unless the
registrant physically sends an investigator. An online marketplace, on the other
hand, is not better positioned to examine goods than the trademark registrant
themselves. Both the online marketplace owner and the trademark registrant can
access listings, inspect them, and even buy them if they suspect infringement.
Indeed, brand owners, not online marketplace owners, are in the best position
to identify infringement in ecommerce because of their expertise in their
products and registered marks.174 Also, as Professors Schechter and Thomas
argue, brand owners are the better cost distributors.175 If marketplaces must
absorb the cost of policing and paying compensation for infringement, the cost
would likely be borne by every user since such cost would likely be distributed
across all goods sold in the marketplace.176 Whereas, if brands—like Tiffany—
absorb the cost, only consumers of that brand would bear the cost since the cost
would be distributed across all of that brand’s genuine goods.177
2. Courts Should Use the Global-Tech Willful Blindness Standard in Contributory
Trademark Infringement Cases
The principle of stare decisis also weighs in favor of restricting the willful
blindness doctrine as an end run around the traditional knowledge requirement
for civil liability.178 Though the Supreme Court has never applied the doctrine of
willful blindness in a trademark case, the Court has in a patent case.179

Id. (“Even had [eBay] been able to inspect the goods, moreover, in many instances it likely
would not have had the expertise to determine whether they were counterfeit.”).
173 See, e.g., Coach Inc. v. Kim’s Management, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-02746-JJOF, 2012 WL
13001933 at *9 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (“A reasonable jury could conclude that the only way Mr.
Kim was able to avoid learning which vendors were continuing to participate in this illicit trade
was by staying away from the market, having his manager conduct ‘periodic inspections’ with
a blindfold on, and taking various other token measures not intended to have any effect on
the counterfeit trade at [the flea market].”).
174 See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98 (noting that the defendant likely did not have the expertise to
identify counterfeit goods); Cleaning Up Online Marketplaces: Protecting Against Stolen, Counterfeit,
and Unsafe Goods: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of K. Dane
Snowden, President and CEO of the Internet Association) (“[B]rand owners and rights
holders . . . are in the best position to identify counterfeit goods.”).
175 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 169, at 203.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Global-Tech, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 765 (2011).
179 Id.
172

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss2/3

22

Ligon Fant: Reconsidering the Willful Blindness Doctrine in Contributory Trad

340

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 29:2

In Global-Tech, the defendant’s subsidiary, Pentalpha,180 copied the design of a
deep fryer that was invented, produced, and patented by SEB S.A.181 Pentalpha
purchased an SEB deep fryer in Hong Kong that had no U.S. patent markings.182
Pentalpha then copied the design and supplied the deep friers to Sunbeam,
Inc.,183 for sale in the United States.184 Pentalpha did not tell its attorney that it
had copied SEB’s fryer, and the attorney did not locate SEB’s patent.185
SEB sued Pentalpha in 1998, alleging that Pentalpha both directly and
contributorily infringed186 SEB’s patent.187 Pentalpha argued that it could not be
liable for inducement since it did not have actual knowledge of SEB’s patent
when it copied the fryer, and the record was indeed devoid of direct evidence
that Pentalpha actually knew about the patent.188 The district court and Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals held Pentalpha liable for inducement under the tort
theory that Pentalpha was deliberately indifferent to a known risk.189 The
Supreme Court agreed that Pentalpha was liable but disagreed with the Federal
Circuit’s reasoning, holding instead that Pentalpha could be liable under the
doctrine of willful blindness.190 The Court reasoned that a defendant is not liable
for induced patent infringement under § 271(b) unless the defendant knew that
the acts they induced infringed a patent.191
The Court turned to the criminal law doctrine of willful blindness and
imported the doctrine into patent law without substantial reasoning as to why
this criminal law doctrine should even apply in a civil suit at all.192 Nonetheless,
Pentalpha was a wholly owned subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., the named party
to the Supreme Court case. Id. at 758. SEB is best known in the United States by its brand
name “T-Fal.” Id.
181 Id. at 757-58.
182 Id. at 758.
183 Sunbeam is an American competitor of the French SEB S.A. Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 758.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 SEB alleged contributory infringement in the form of inducement under 35 USCA § 271(b).
Id. at 759. Though inducement appears textually in 35 USC § 271 as a distinct theory of indirect
liability separate from contributory infringement, it is treated by the courts as evidence of
contributory infringement. Id. at 764. Knowledge of a patent and thus intent to induce
infringement of a known patent is required for contributory liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271. Id.
at 765 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 525 (1964)).
187 Id. at 758-59.
188 Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 759.
189 Id. at 754.
190 Id. at 765 (“[W]e agree that deliberate indifference to a known risk that a patent exists is
not the appropriate standard . . . We nevertheless affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
because the evidence in this case was plainly sufficient to support a finding of Pentalpha’s
knowledge under the doctrine of willful blindness.”).
191 Id. at 766.
192 Id. at 766-68 (“Given the long history of willful blindness and its wide acceptance in the
Federal Judiciary, we can see no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for
induced patent infringement.”).
180
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the Court articulated a narrow view of the willful blindness doctrine with a
“limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence”:193
[A] willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to
avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can
almost be said to have actually known of the critical facts . . . By
contrast, a reckless defendant is one who merely knows of a
substantial and unjustified risk of such wrongdoing . . . and a
negligent defendant is one who should have known of a similar
risk but, in fact, did not . . . .194
The Court found the Federal Circuit’s deliberate indifference test lacking for
two reasons. First, the test allowed mere knowledge of a known risk to satisfy
the knowledge requirement.195 Second, the test required only deliberate
indifference to the known risk rather than some action on the part of the inducer
to avoid learning about the infringement.196 Ultimately, the court held that the
facts that the specific type of deep fryer was an innovative piece of technology,
the CEO’s familiarity with the market, and Pentalpha’s failure to inform its
attorney that it had copied SEB’s design were sufficient to meet its high bar for
willful blindness.197
In a dissent, Justice Kennedy questioned the use of the willful blindness
doctrine at all in a civil case:
Even if one were to accept the substitution of equally
blameworthy mental states in criminal cases in light of the
retributive purposes of the criminal law, those purposes have no
force in the domain of patent law that controls in this case . . .
[T]his Court has never before held that willful blindness can
substitute for a statutory requirement of knowledge.198

Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 769 (“[T]he doctrine of willful blindness . . . [has] two basic
requirements: (1) The defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that
a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”)
(emphasis added).
194 Id. at 769-70 (emphasis added).
195 Id. at 770.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 770-71.
198 Id. at 773 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193
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The Global-Tech Court suggested that a higher level of specificity of
information should be required for willful blindness than the standard the circuit
courts have used in trademark infringement cases: “[D]efendants cannot escape
[culpability] by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts
that are strongly suggested by the circumstances. The traditional rationale for the doctrine
[of willful blindness] is that defendants who behave in this manner are just as
culpable as those who have actual knowledge.”199 Marketplaces that fail to root
out infringement when neither the specific goods nor the specific vendor has
been identified to them surely cannot be considered just as culpable as
marketplace owners who facilitate infringement knowingly.200
Since “patent law and trademark law share common historical and legal
origins,” the Supreme Court should support applying Global-Tech’s formulation
of the willful blindness doctrine to trademark infringement as well.201 At least
one district court, the Northern District of Georgia, has already done so.202
IV. CONCLUSION
Back to Jacqui and her brooches. As it stands, if Weiss hopes to prevent
infringers from tarnishing its reputation, Weiss could sue for contributory
trademark infringement—but in what circuit? Depending on what Weiss had
done to police its mark, Weiss may be encouraged to forum shop. If Weiss
aggressively policed its trademark and eBay had failed to remove specific listings
Weiss had flagged as infringing, Weiss may choose whatever court is most
convenient. But if Weiss had merely notified eBay that infringing products, the
outcome of the litigation might depend on what court hears Weiss’ claims.
Limiting the willful blindness doctrine for online marketplaces would
decrease commercial uncertainty. Natural economic forces incentivize both
online marketplace owners and trademark registrants to try to shift the burden
of policing onto each other.203 The stakes for marketplace owners are extremely
high, and the current jurisprudence provides no clear standards for avoiding
liability.

Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that a defendant had no affirmative duty
to root out potential infringement).
201 Lorelei D. Ritchie, Is “Willful Blindness” the New “Recklessness” after Global-Tech?, 21 FED. CIR.
BAR J. 165 (2011).
202 Coach Inc. v. Kim’s Management, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-02746-JJOF, 2012 WL 13001933, at
*10 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2012) (denying summary judgment because a reasonable jury could
find the defendant flea market owner willfully blind under the Global-Tech standard and thus
liable for contributory trademark infringement).
203 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 7, at 203 (noting that neither party tends to believe they
should have to absorb the cost of policing trademarks).
199
200
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The absence of a clear safe harbor drives up costs for all parties involved.
The lack of a clear standard for avoiding liability, coupled with the high stakes if
found liable for contributory infringement, puts the burden of policing on
marketplaces. Even eBay’s $20 million per year204 does not obviously surpass its
potential liability if it were found liable for infringement of Tiffany’s
trademark.205 So the party that is not better positioned and lacks the expertise to
police the trademark is put in a position where it must allocate incredible
resources to a problem it is not very competent to solve.206 A clear safe harbor
standard for willful blindness would solve this problem and prevent unnecessary
costs. One simple solution to this is for courts to follow Global-Tech and require
that a trademark registrant provide specific information about a specific listing
or vendor before a marketplace owner can be found to be willfully blind.
Circuit courts that have not yet decided what specificity of knowledge is
required under a willful blindness analysis should require evidence that an online
marketplace had specific information about a specific listing or vendor before
unlocking the door to the willful blindness doctrine. This knowledge requirement
would shift the burden of policing back onto the trademark registrants, who are
in at least as good a position to police trademarks as online marketplace owners
and have the expertise to effectively do so.
Congress could pass legislation that deals with this issue. The SHOP SAFE
Act and similar legislation falls short of fixing the problem and fails to resolve
the commercial problems associated with contributory trademark infringement.
Shifting the burden of policing to the registrant, who has the expertise to identify
and assess goods that are likely infringing, would address the infringement
problem. To fix the commercial problem, a definite safe harbor provision is
needed to minimize duplication of efforts and discourage excessive litigation.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court should review a contributory trademark
infringement case like Tiffany or Omega. The Court should either (1) establish a
uniform standard for the specificity of knowledge required for liability under the
willful blindness doctrine or (2) eliminate the doctrine as a liability theory in this
context. The Global-Tech standard is simple enough and sufficient to provide the
certainty commerce requires. The Court could allow for a slightly broader
application of the willful blindness doctrine for physical marketplaces, which are
in a better position to identify infringement. The Court should certainly require
more specific knowledge for online marketplaces that never take possession of
goods. A uniform standard is needed to promote efficiency, protect consumers
and trademark registrants, and give commercial actors the predictability they
need to plan for the future.

Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2010).
See, e.g., Omega, 984 F.3d at 258 (noting that the Lanham Act’s statutory damages provision
allows for $1,000-$200,000 per counterfeit mark) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1117).
206 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that eBay did not
have the expertise required to identify infringing goods).
204
205
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